A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure

1. Gustavo Bergantiños
2. B.Casa-Mendez
3. m. g. Fiestras-Janeiro
4. J. J. Vidal-Puga

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In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure.We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues [Chae, S., Heidhues, P., 2004. A group bargaining solution. Mathematical Social Sciences 48, 37–53] and Vidal-Puga [Vidal-Puga, J.J., 2005a.Abargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solutionwith coalition structure. Economic Theory 25, 679–701]. Several axiomatic characterizations and two non-cooperative mechanisms are proposed.

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