Monotonicity of the core-center of the airport game
- Julio González-Díaz 1
- Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo 2
- Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo 2
- Estela Sánchez Rodríguez 2
- 1 Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, España
- 2 Universidade de Vigo, España
ISSN: 1863-8279, 1134-5764
Any de publicació: 2015
Volum: 23
Número: 3
Pàgines: 773-798
Tipus: Article
Altres publicacions en: Top
Objectius de Desenvolupament Sostenible
Resum
One of the main goals of this paper is to improve the understanding of the way in which the core of a specific cooperative game, the airport game (Littlechild and Owen, Manag Sci 20:370–372, 1973), responds to monotonicity properties. Since such properties are defined for single-valued allocation rules, we use the core-center (González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez, Int J Game Theory 36:27–46, 2007) as a proxy for the core. This is natural, since the core-center is the center of gravity of the core and its behavior with respect to a given property can be interpreted as the “average behavior” of the core. We also introduce the lower-cost increasing monotonicity and higher-cost decreasing monotonicity properties that reflect whether a variation in a particular agent’s cost is beneficial to the other agents.