Bargaining sets in finite economies

  1. Carlos Hervés-Beloso 1
  2. Javier Hervés-Estévez 1
  3. Emma Moreno-García 2
  1. 1 Universidade de Vigo
    info

    Universidade de Vigo

    Vigo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05rdf8595

  2. 2 Universidad de Salamanca
    info

    Universidad de Salamanca

    Salamanca, España

    ROR https://ror.org/02f40zc51

Revista:
Working paper series ( RGEA )

Ano de publicación: 2017

Número: 5

Tipo: Documento de traballo

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Resumo

We provide a notion of bargaining set for a finite production economy based on a two-step veto mechanism `a la Aubin (1979). We show that this bargaining set and the set of Walrasian allocations coincide. At the light of our result we refine Mas-Colell’s bargaining set for replicas of a finite economy. Our main result shows the persistence of Anderson et al. (1997) non-convergence of the bargaining sets to the set of Walrasian allocations. In addition, we analyze how the restriction on the formation of coalitions affects the bargaining set.

Fonte de datos: Dialnet