An axiomatic approach to the value in games with coalition structure.

  1. Gómez Rúa, María
  2. Vidal Puga, Juan José
Liburua:
XXX Congreso Nacional de Estadística e Investigación Operativa y de las IV Jornadas de Estadística Pública: actas

Argitaletxea: Comité organizador del XXX Congreso Nacional de Estadística e Investigación Operativa y IV Jornadas de Estadística Pública

ISBN: 978-84-690-7249-3

Argitalpen urtea: 2007

Biltzarra: Congreso Nacional de Estadística e Investigación Operativa (30. 2007. Valladolid)

Mota: Biltzar ekarpena

Laburpena

We study the value for transferable utility games with coalition struc- tures. In these games, the players partition themselves into groups for the purpose of bargaining. We provide an axiomatic characterization using the properties of balanced contributions and equal sharing in unanimity games, among others.