A monotonic and merge‐proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations
- 1 Research Group in Economic Analysis. Universidade de Vigo
- Ginzo Villamayor, María José (ed. lit.)
- Alonso Meijide, José María (ed. lit.)
- Ramil Novo, Luis Alberto (ed. lit.)
Editorial: Sociedade Galega para a Promoción da Estatística e da Investigación de Operacións (SGAPEIO) ; Servizo de Publicacións ; Deputación de Lugo
ISBN: 978-84-8192-522-7
Ano de publicación: 2015
Páxinas: 33-39
Congreso: Congreso galego de Estatística e Investigación de Operacións (12. 2015. Lugo)
Tipo: Achega congreso
Resumo
We present a new model for cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems, so that the planner can identify the agents that merge. Under this new framework, and as opposed to the traditional model, there exist rules that satisfy merge-proofness. Besides, by strengthening this property and adding some other properties, such as population-monotonicity and solidarity, we characterize a unique rule that coincides with the weighted Shapley value of an associated cost game.