Una reorientación teórica de la economía políticael análisis político de los costes de transacción

  1. Arias Moreira, Xosé Carlos
  2. Caballero Miguez, Gonzalo
Aldizkaria:
Revista española de ciencia política

ISSN: 1575-6548

Argitalpen urtea: 2003

Zenbakia: 8

Orrialdeak: 131-161

Mota: Artikulua

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Beste argitalpen batzuk: Revista española de ciencia política

Laburpena

Desde mediados del siglo XX, los desarrollos teóricos de la economía neoclásica han sido trasladados al análisis de los fenómenos políticos mediante la formulación de la teoría de la elección pública, la cual presenta al político como un sujeto enteramente racional e introduce la noción de mercado político. Sin embargo, y a pesar de los logros teóricos de la Public Choice y de su aportación más notable, la economía política constitucional, sus limitaciones epistemológicas y empíricas se han ido haciendo evidentes. La aparición a lo largo de las últimas décadas del siglo XX de la nueva economía institucional, edificada sobre la noción coaseana de costes de transacción y sobre la northiana de instituciones, ha permitido la configuración de un nuevo marco teórico para el análisis positivo de lo político, el análisis político de costes de transacción. En este artículo se exponen de un modo sistemático las principales aportaciones de este enfoque, tomando como punto de partida su comparación con la economía política constitucional.

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