Contracts for Uncertain Delivery

  1. Hervés Beloso, Carlos
  2. Silva, João Correia da
Revista:
Working paper series ( RGEA )

Ano de publicación: 2005

Número: 2

Tipo: Documento de traballo

Obxectivos de Desenvolvemento Sustentable

Resumo

We propose the notion of objects of choice as uncertain consumption bundles, extending the formulation of Arrow (1953). Agents sign "contracts for uncertain delivery", which specify a list of alternative bundles, instead of a single one. This allows us to incorporate uncertainty and asymmetric information in the model of Arrow-Debreu. Relatively to the model of Radner (1968), efficiency of trade is increased and some "no trade" situations are avoided, while the classical results still hold: existence of core and competitive equilibrium, core convergence, welfare theorems, etc