Economía de las institucionesde Coase y North a Williamson y Ostrom

Referencias bibliográficas

• Acemoglu, D. y Johnson, S. (2005): «Unbun­ dling Institutions», Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 113, N.º 5, 949­995.
• Acemoglu, D.; Johnson, S. y Robinson, J. A. (2001): «The Colonial Origins of Comparati­ve Development: An Empirical Investiga­on.» A.E.R. 91 (December): 1369­1401.
• Acemoglu, D. y Robinson, J. A. (2008): «Per­sistente of Power, Elites and Institutions», American Economic Review, 98 (1), 267­293.
• Ahn, T. K. y Ostrom, E. (2002): «Social capital and the second generation theories of collec­tive action: An analytical approach to the forms of social capital», Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Assocoation, Boston, Massachusetts, August 29. Septem­ ber 1, USA.
• Allen, D.W. (1991): «What are transaction costs?», Research in Law and Economics, N. 14, 1­18.
• Alston, L. J.; Mattiace, S. y Nonnenmacher , T. (2009): «Coercion, Culture, and Con­tracts: Labor and Debt on Henequen Hacien­ das in Yucatán, México, 1870­1915», Journal of Economic History, V. 60, N. 2, 104­137.
• Álvarez-Díaz, M. y Caballero, G. (2008): «The Quality of Institutions: A Genetic Pro­gramming Approach», Economic Modelling, V. 25, 161­169.
• Anderies, J. M.; Janssen, M. A. y Ostrom, E. (2004): «A framework to analyze the robust­ ness of social­ecological systems from an ins­ titutional perspective», Ecology and Society, 9 (1), art. 18.
• Aoki, M. et al. (2001): Comparative Institutional Analysis. The MIT Press. Cambridge.
• Arias, X. C. y Caballero, G. (2003): «Institu­ciones, Costes de Transacción y Políticas Pú­blicas: un panorama», Revista de Economía Institucional, N. 8, 117­146.
• Arrow, K. J. (1969): «The organization of eco­nomic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of market versus nonmarket allocation», 91st Congress The Analysis and Evaluation of Pu­blic Expenditure: The PPB System, Vol. 1, 59­73. Government Printing Office. Was­ hington DC.
• Arrow, K. J. (1987): «Reflections on the Essays», 727­ 734, en FEIWEL, G.: Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy. New York University Press. Nueva York.
• Arrow, K. J. (1999): «Observation on social capital», 3­5, en Dasgupta, P. e I. Serageldin: Social capital: a multifaceted perspective. World Bank. Washington D. C.
• Becker, C. D. y Ostrom, E. (1995): «Human ecology and resource sustainability», Ann. Rev. Ecol. Syst., 26, 113­133.
• Benham, A. y Benham, L. (2000): «Measuring the Costs of Exchange» in Ménard, Claude, (ed), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations: Perspectives from New Institutional Economics, Edward Elgar, 2000, 367­375.
• Brinton, M. C. y Nee, V. (eds.) (1998): The New Institutionalism in Sociology. Russell Sage Foundation. Nueva York.
• Brondizio, E. S.; Ostrom, E. y Young, O. R. (2009): «Connectivity and the Governance of Multilevel Social­Ecological Systems: The role of social capital», Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 34, 253­278.
• Brousseau, E. y Glachant, J. M. (2008): New Institutional Economics. A Guidebook. Cam­ bridge University Press.
• Buchanan, J. M. (1975): «A Contractarian Pa­radigm for Applying Economic Theory», American Economic Review, 65 (2), 225­230.
• Caballero, G. (2001): «La Nueva Economía Institucional», Sistema, N. 156, 59­86.
• Caballero, G. (2002): «El programa de la nueva econo­mía institucional: lo macro, lo micro y lo po­lítico», Ekonomiaz, N. 50, 230­261.
• Caballero, G. (2004): «Instituciones e Historia Econó­mica: enfoques y teorías institucionales», Revista de Economía Institucional, N. 10, 137­ 157.
• Caballero, G. (2005): «Instituciones, federalismo de­fensor de mercados y Estado de las Autono­mías. Un análisis de segunda generación», El Trimestre Económico, N. 286, 283­327.
• Caballero, G. (2007): «Comisiones, grupos parlamen­tarios y diputados en la gobernanza del Con­greso de los diputados», Revista de Estudios Políticos, N. 135, 67­107.
• Caballero, G. (2011): «La Nueva Economía Institucio­nal: las contribuciones de Oliver Williamson y Elinor Ostrom», Principios. Estudios de Economía Política, N. 18, 5­24.
• Caballero, G. y Arias, X. C. (2003): «Una re­orientación teórica de la economía política: el análisis político de costes de transacción», Revista Española de Ciencia Política, N. 8, 131­161.
• Caballero, G.; Garza, M. D. y Varela, M. (2008): «Institutions and Management of Fishing Resources: The governance of the Galician model», Ocean & Coastal Management, Vol. 51, N. 8­9, 625­631.
• Caballero, G.; Garza, M. D. y Varela, M. (2009): «The institutional foundations of economic performance of mussel produc­tion: The Spanish case of the Galician floa­ting raft culture», Marine Policy, Vol. 33, 288­296.
• Caballero, G. y Kingston, C. (2005): «Capital social e instituciones en el proceso de cambio económico», Ekonomiaz, N. 59, 72­93.
• Coase, R. H. (1937): «The Nature of the Firm», Economica, N. 4, 386­405.
• Coase, R. H. (1946): «The Marginal Cost Controver­sy», Economica, New Series, V. 13, N. 51, 169­182.
• Coase, R. H. (1959): «The Federal Communications Commission», Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 2, 1­40.
• Coase, R. H. (1960): «The Problem of Social Cost», Journal of Law and Economics, V. 3, N. 1, 1­44.
• Coase, R. H. (1972): «The Appointment of Pigou as Marshall’s Successor», Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 15, 473­485.
• Coase, R. H. (1984): «The New Institutional Econo­mics», Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, Vol. 140, N. 1, 229­231.
• Coase, R. H. (1992): «The Institutional Structure of Production», American. Economic Review, 82 (4), 713­719.
• Coase, R. H. (1994): La Empresa, el Mercado y la Ley (artículos de Coase). Alianza Economía. Ma­ drid.
• Coase, R. H. (1998): «The New Institutional Econo­ mics», The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 88, N. 2, 72­74.
• Coase, R. H. (1999a): «An Interview with Ronald Coase», ISNIE Newsletter, Vol. 2, N. 1, 3­10.
• Coase, R. H. (1999b): «The task of the Society», ISNIE Newsletter, Vol. 2, N. 2, 1­6.
• Commons, J. R. (1932): «The problem of corre­lating Law, Economics and Ethics», Wisconsin Law Review, N. 8, 2­26.
• Copeland, B. R. y Taylor, M. S. (2009): «Tra­de, Tragedy and the Commons», American Economic Review, 99 (3), 725­749.
• Davis, L. E. y North, D. C. (1971): Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
• Denzau, A. T. y North, D. C. (1994): «Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions», Kyklos, Vol. 47, 3­31.
• Dietz, T.; Ostrom, E. y Stern, P. C. (2003): «The struggle to govern the commons», Science, Vol. 302, 1907­1912.
• Dixit, A. (1996): The making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective. The MIT Press. Cambridge.
• Dixit, A. (2009): «Governance Institutions and Economic Activity», American Economic Review, 99 (1), 5­24.
• Easterly, W. (2008): «Institutions: Top Down or Bottom up?», American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 98 (2), 95­99.
• Eggertsson, T. (1990): Economic Behaviour and Institutions. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
• Eggertsson, T. (2005): Imperfect Institutions. Ann Ar­bor: The University of Michigan Press.
• Frey, B. (2010): «Lin Ostrom’s Contribution to Economics: A personal evaluation», Public Choice, V. 143 (3­4), 303­308.
• Furubotn, E. G. y Richter, R. (1998): Institutions and Economic Theory. The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics. The Uni­versity of Michigan Press. Michigan.
• Gardner, R. y Ostrom, E. (1991): «Rules and Games», Public Choice, N. 70, 121­149.
• Garoupa, N. y Stephen, F. (2004): «Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid», Economi­ ca, vol. 71, 493­500.
• Gibson, C. C.; McKean, M. A. y Ostrom, E. (2000): People and Forests. The MIT Press.
• Gonzalez de Lara, Y.; Greif, A. y Jha, S. (2008): «The Administrative Foundations of Self­Enforcing Constitutions», American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 98 (2), 105­109.
• Gordon, H. S. (1954): «The economic theory of a common property resource: the fishery», Journal of Political Economy, 62, 124­142.
• Greif, A. (2006): Institutions and the path to modern economy, Cambridge University Press.
• Groenewegen, J. et al. (1995): «On integrating new and old institutionalism: Douglass C. North building bridges», Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 29, N. 2, 467­476.
• Hadfield, G. K. (2005): «The many legal insti­tutions that support contractual com­ mitments», 175­204, en Menard, C. y M. Shirley (ed): Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer.
• Haggard, S. y Noland, M. (2010): «Reform from below: Behavioral and institutional change in North Korea», Journal of Economic Behavior & Organizations, 73, 133­152.
• Hahn, F. (1981): «General Equilibrium Theory», en Bell, D. y Kristol, I.: The Crisis in Economic Theory. Basic Books. Nueva York.
• Hall, P. y Taylor, R. (1996): «Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms», Political Studies, 44, 936­957.
• Hardin, G. (1968). «The Tragedy of the Com­mons», Science, V. 162, 1243­48.
• Henry, P. B. y Miller, C. (2009): «Institutions versus Policies: A Tale of Two Islands», American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 99 (2), 261­267.
• Hodgson, G. M. (1998): «The Approach of Ins­ titutional Economics», Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVI, 166­192.
• Joskow, P. (1991): «The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Uti­lity Regulatory policies», Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, N. 7, 53­83.
• Kingston, C. y Caballero, G. (2009): «Com­paring theories of institutional change», Journal of Institutional Economics, 5(2), 151­180.
• Knack, S. y Keefer, P. (1997): «Does Social Ca­pital Have an Economic Payoff?. A Cross­ Country Investigation», Quaterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, N. 4, 1251­1288.
• Laerhoven, F. V. y Ostrom, E. (2007): «Tradi­tions and Trends in the Study of the Com­mons», International Journal of the Com­ mons, Vol 1 (1), 3­28.
• Libecap, G. (1999): «Contracting for property rights», en Ferry Anderson y Fred S. Mc­ Chesney, The Law and Economics of Property Rights.
• Libecap, G. (2007): «The assignment of property rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for contemporary environmental and resource policy», The Journal of Economic History, 67(2), 257­291.
• Mantzavinos, C.; North, D. C. y Shariq, S. (2001): «Learning, Change and Economic Performance». Annual Conference of the In­ ternational Society for New Institutional Economics. Berkeley.
• Menard, C. y Shirley, M. (ed.) (2005): Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Sprin­ ger.
• Menard, C. y Shirley, M. (2010): «The Contribution of Douglass North to New Institutional Economics». Conference on «The Legacy and Work of Douglass C. North Understanding Institu­tions and Development Economics». Center for New Institutional Social Sciences. Was­hington University in St. Louis. Estados Unidos.
• Menard, C. (2005): «A new institutional appro­ach to organization», 281­319, en Menard, C. y M. Shirley (ed): Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer.
• Milgrom, P. R.; North, D. C. y Weingast, B. R. (1990): «The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs», Economics and Politics, N. 2, 1­23.
• North, D. C. (1961): The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860. Prentice­Hall.
• North, D. C. (1981): Structure and Change in Economic History. W.W. Norton. Nueva York.
• North, D. C. (1985): «Transaction Costs in History», Journal of European Economic History, Vol. 14, 557­576.
• North, D. C. (1989): «A Transaction Cost Approach to the Historical Development of Polities and Economies», Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, N. 145, 661­668.
• North, D. C. (1990a): Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge
• North, D. C. (1990b): «A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics». Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 2, N. 4, 355­367.
• North, D. C. (1993): «Institutions and Credible Com­mitment», Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 149, N. 1, 11­23.
• North, D. C. (1995). «Five propositions about institu­tional change», 15­26, en Knight, J. y I. Sened (eds) (1995): Explaining social institutions. University of Michigan Press.
• North, D. C. (1994): «Economic Performance through Time», The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, N. 3, 359­368.
• North, D. C. (1999): «In Anticipation of the Marriage of Political and Economic Theory», 314­317, en Alt, J., Levi, M. y E. Ostrom: Competition and Cooperation. Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science. Russell Sage Foundation. Nueva York.
• North, D. C. (2000): «La evolución histórica de las formas de gobierno», Revista de Economía Institucional, N. 2, 133­148.
• North, D. C. (2005). Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton University Press. Princeton.
• North, D. C.; Summerhill y Weingast, B. R. (2000): «Order, Disorder and Economic Change: Latin America versus North Ameri­ can», en B. Bueno de Mesquita and H. Rot (eds): Governing for prosperity, Yale Universi­ sity Press.
• North, D. C. y Thomas, R. P. (1973): The Rise of the Western World: a New Economic History. Cambridge University Press. Cam­ bridge.
• North, D. C. y Wallis, J. J. (1994): «Integra­ting Institutional Change and Technical Change in Economic History. A Transaction Cost Approach», Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 150, N. 4, 609­ 624.
• North, D. C., Wallis, J.J. y Weingast, B. R. (2009): Violence and Social Orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge University Press.
• North, D. C. y Weingast, B. R. (1989): «Cons­titutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in se­ venteenth­century England», The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 49, N. 4, 803­832.
• Nye, J. V. (1997): «Thinking about the State: Property Rights, Trade, and Changing Con­tractual Arrangements in a World with Coer­cion», 121­144, en Drobak, J. N. y J. Nye (eds) (1997): The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics. Academic Press. San Diego.
• Ostrom, E. (1990): Governing the commons, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Ostrom, E. (1994): «Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action», Journal of Theoretical Politics, V. 6, N. 4, 527­562.
• Ostrom, E. (1995): «Self­organization and Social Ca­pital», Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 4, N. 1, 131­159.
• Ostrom, E. (1999): «Social capital: A fad or a funda­mental concept», 172­214, en Dasgupta, P. e I. Serageldin: Social capital: a multifaceted perspective. World Bank. Washington D.C.
• Ostrom, E. (2004): «Rules without enforcement are but words on paper», IHDP, N. 2, 8­12.
• Ostrom, E. (2005): Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton University Press.
• Ostrom, E. (2007a): «A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas», Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 104, N. 39, 15181­15187.
• Ostrom, E. (2007b): «Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis», Journal of Institutional Economics, 3 (3), 239­264.
• Ostrom, E. (2008): «Institutions and the environment», Economic Affairs, Vol. 28 (3), 24­31.
• Ostrom, E. (2009): «A general framework for an analyzing sustainability of Social­Ecological Sys­ sustainability of Social­Ecological Systems», Science, 325, 419­422.
• Ostrom, E. (2010): «Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems», American economic Review, 100, 641­672.
• Ostrom, E.; Janssen, M. A. y Anderies, J. M. (2007): «Going beyond panaceas», Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 104, N. 39, 15176­15178.
• Peters, B. G. (1999): Institutional theory in political science. The new institutionalism. Conti­ nuum. London.
• Putnam, R. D. et al. (1993): Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Prin­ceton University Press. Princenton.
• Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996): «The New Governance: Governing without Government», Political Studies, XLIV, 652­667.
• Rodrik, D. (2008): «Second­ Best Institutions», American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 98 (2), 100­104.
• Rodrik, D.; Subramanian, A. y Trebbi, F. (2004): «Institutions Rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development», Journal of Economic Growth, 9, 2, 131­165.
• Rutherford, M. (1994): Institutions in Economics. Cambridge University Press. Cam­ bridge.
• Schlager E. y Ostrom, E. (1992). «Property Rights Regimes and Natural Resources. A conceptual analysis», Land Economics, 68(3), 249­262.
• Schofield, N. y Caballero, G. (eds.) (2011): Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting. Springer. En prensa.
• Shepsle, K. (2010): «Elinor Ostrom: Uncom­mon», Public Choice, V. 143 (3­4), 335­337.
• Shirley, M. (2005): «Institutions and Develop­ment», 611­638, Menard, C. y M. Shirley (ed): Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer.
• Solow, R. M. (1999): «Notes on social capital and economic performance», 6­12, en Das­ gupta, P. e I. Serageldin: Social capital: a multifaceted perspective. World Bank. Washing­ ton D. C.
• Spiller, P. y Tommasi, M. (2005): «The Institutions of Regulations», in C. Menard and M. Shirley: Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer.
• Spiller, P. y Tommasi, M. (2007): The institutional foundations of public policy in Argentina. CUP.
• Stigler, G. J. (1966): The Theory of Price. Mac­ millan and Co. Nueva York.
• Toboso, F. (1997): «¿En qué se diferencian los Enfoques de Análisis de la Vieja y la Nueva Economía Institucional?», Hacienda Pública Española, N. 143, 175­192.
• Toboso, F. (2001): «Institutional individualism and institutional change: the search for a middle way mode of explanation», Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, 765­783.
• Toboso, F. y Compés, R. (2003): «Nuevas Tendencias Analíticas en el ámbito de la Nueva Economía Institucional. La incorporación de los aspectos distributivos», El Trimestre Económico, N. 280, 637­671.
• Wallis, J. J. y North, D. (1986): «Measuring the transaction sector in the American eco­nomy, 1870­1970,» en Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman (1986): Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth. Uni­ versity of Chicago Press.
• Weingast, B. R. (1995): «The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market­ Preserving Fe­deralism and Economic Development», Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 11, N. 1, 1­31.
• Weingast, B. R. y Marshall, W. J. (1988): «The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets», Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, 1, 132­163. Williamson, O. E. (1971): «The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations», The American Economic Review, 61(2), 112­123.
• Williamson, O. E. (1975): Markets and Hierarchies. The Free Press. Nueva York.
• Williamson, O. E. (1979): «Transaction ­Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations», Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (2), 233­ 262.
• Williamson, O. E. (1981): «The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach», American Journal of Sociology, 87 (3), 548­577.
• Williamson, O. E. (1985): The Economics Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. The Free Press. Nueva York.
• Williamson, O. E. (1986): Economic Organizations: firms, market and policy control. Harvester. UK.
• Williamson, O. E. (1994): «The Institutions and Governance of Economic Development and Reform». Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1994. World Bank. Washington, D.C.
• Williamson, O. E. (1996): The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Williamson, O. E. (1999): «Public versus Private Bureau­cracies: A Transaction Cost Economic Pers­pective», Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 15, N. 1, 307­342.
• Williamson, O. E. (2000): «The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead», Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 38, 595­613.
• Williamson, O. E. (2002a): «The Lens of Contract: Private Ordering», American Economic Review, 92(2), 438­443.
• Williamson, O. E. (2002b): «The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract», Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, N. 3, 171­195.
• Williamson, O. E. (2005a): «The Economics of Governance», American Economic Review, 95 (2), 1­18.
• Williamson, O. E. (2005b): «Why Law, Economics and Or­ganization», Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, 1, 369­396.
• Williamson, O. E. (2007): «An interview with Oliver Wi­lliamson», Journal of Institutional Economics, 3 (3), 373­386.
• Williamson, O. E. (2010): «Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression», American Econo­ mic Review, 100, 673­690.