Perspectivas de análisis institucional contemporáneoenfoques, métodos y experimentos

  1. Caballero Miguez, Gonzalo
  2. Vázquez Vicente, Xosé Henrique
Revista:
Ekonomiaz: Revista vasca de economía

ISSN: 0213-3865

Ano de publicación: 2011

Título do exemplar: La nueva economía institucional

Número: 77

Páxinas: 222-251

Tipo: Artigo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso aberto editor

Outras publicacións en: Ekonomiaz: Revista vasca de economía

Resumo

Instituzionalismo berriak gizarte zien tzietatik eratorritako azterketa instituzionalaren hainbat ikuspuntu har tzen ditu kontuan. Ikuspuntu horien artean, ekonomia instituzional berriak aurrerakun tza garran tzi tsuak eragin ditu egungo azterketa instituzionalean, baina ez du bere gain hartu azterketa metodo bakar bat, metodo ani tzekoez oinarritutako lana baizik. Kasu praktikoen, azterketa konparatiboaren, ekonometria erabileren edota azterketa esperimentalen bidez lortu da ekonomia instituzional berriaren arrakasta enpirikoa. Artikulu honek azterketa instituzionalaren metodo eta ikuspuntu ani tzeko perspektiba eskain tzeaz gain, azterketa azalpenak eta azterketa historikoa eta instituzional konparatiboa ere jorra tzen ditu.

Referencias bibliográficas

  • Acemoglu, D.; Johnson, S. y Robinson, J. A. (2001): «The colonial origins of comparative development: an empirical investigation», The American Economic Review, 91: 1369­-1401.
  • Alston, L. J. (2008): «The «case» for Case Studies in New Institutional Economics, pp. 103­-121, en Brousseau, E. y J. M. Glachant (2008): New Institutional Economics. A Guidebok. CUP.
  • Álvarez-Díaz, M. y Caballero, G. (2008): «The quality of institutions: a genetic programming approach», Economic Modelling, Vol. 25, pp. 161­-169.
  • Álvarez-Díaz, M.; Caballero, G. y Soliño, M. (2011): «The institutional determinants of CO2 Emissions: A computational mode­lling approach using Artificial Neural Net­works and Genetic Programming», Environmetrics, Vol. 22 (1), pp. 42­-49.
  • Aoki, M. (1994): «The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional Complementary», International Economic Review, Vol. 35, pp. 657-­676.
  • Aoki, M. (1996): «Towards a Comparative Insti­tutional Analysis: motivations and some ten­tative theorizing», The Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 47, N. 1, pp. 1­19.
  • Aoki, M. et al. (2001): Comparative Institutional Analysis. The MIT Press. Cambridge.
  • Armstrong, M. (1994): «Delegation and Dis­cretion». Discussion Paper in Economics and Econometrics, Department of Economics, University of Southampton.
  • Arocena, P.; Villanueva, M.; Arévalo, R. y Vázquez, X. H. (2011): «Why are firms cha­llenging conventional wisdom on moral hazard? Revisiting the wage­effort hypothesis», Industrial and Corporate Change, 20 (2), 433­-455.
  • Arrow, K. J. (1987): «Reflections on the Es­says», pp. 727­ 734, en Feiwel, G.: Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy. New York University Press. Nue­ va York.
  • Arruñada, B. y Casari, M. (2009): «How en­forcement institutions affect impersonal ex­change», presentado en Conference on Mea­suring Law and Institutions III: Analytical and Methodological Challenges», 2­3 Octu­bre, UPF, Barcelona.
  • Bates, R. (2010): «The New Institutionalism», Conference on The Legacy and Work of Douglass North: Understanding Institutions and Development Economics. Center for New Ins­titutional Socialsciences. Washington Uni­versity, St. Louis. USA.
  • Bates, R. H.; Greif, A.; Levi, M.; Rosenthal, J. L. y Weingast, B. R. (1998): Analytic Narratives. Princenton University Press. Princenton.
  • Becker, G. (1976): «Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology», Journal of Economic Literature, 14 (3), 817­-827.
  • Caballero, G. (2004): «Instituciones e Historia Económica: Teorías y Perspectivas Institu­cionales», Revista de Economía Institucional, Vol. 6, N. 10, 135­-156.
  • Caballero, G. (2008): El regreso de las instituciones al análisis político. La emergencia de un nuevo institucionalismo transaccional. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidade de Vigo.
  • Caballero, G. (2011): «Institutional Foundations, Com­mittee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Ins­titutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain)» en Schofield, N. y G. Caba­llero (eds) (2011): Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting. Springer.
  • Caballero, G. y Gallo, A. (2008): «Las diná­micas institucionales del éxito y del fracaso económico: Un análisis institucional históri­co y comparativo de España y Argentina (1950­2000)», Revista de Economía Mundial, N. 20, 99­-137.
  • Cadsby, C. y Maynes, E. (1998): «Choosing Between a Socially Efficient and Free­ Riding Equilibrium: Nurses versus Economics and Business Students,» Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 37 (2), 183-­192.
  • Carter, J. y Iron, M. (1991): «Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?», Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (2), 171­-177.
  • Coase, R. H. (1982): How Should Economists Choose. Warren Nutter Lecture in Political Economy. The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Washington.
  • Coase, R. H. (1999a): «An Interview with Ronald Coase», ISNIE Newsletter, Vol. 2, N. 1, 3-­10.
  • Coase, R. H. (1999b): «The task of the Society», ISNIE Newsletter, Vol. 2, N. 2, 1­6.
  • Coase, R. H. (2006): «The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors», Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Volume 15 (2), 255­-278
  • Dal Bó, P.; Foster, A. y Putterman, L. (2010): «Institutions and Behavior: Experi­mental Evidence on the Effects of Democra­cy», American Economic Review, 100, 2205­-2229.
  • Dow, G. K. (1987): «The function of authority in transaction cost economics». Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 8/1: 13­38.
  • Eggertsson, T. (1990): Economic Behaviour and Institutions. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
  • Enemark, D.; Mccubbins, M. D.; Paturi, R. y Weller, N. (2009): «Good Edge, Bad Edge: Coordination, Connectivity and Constraint in Networks», paper presented at Oliver Wi­lliamson Seminar on Institutional Analysis.
  • Evans, P. et al. (1985): Bringing the State back in. Cambridge University Press.
  • Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J. y Sutton, R. (2005): «Economics Language and Assumptions: How Theories Can Become Self­Fulfilling» Academy of Management Review, 30 (1), 8­24.
  • Field, E.; Jayachandran y Pande, R. (2010): «Do traditional institutions constrain female entrepeneurship? A field experiment on Bu­siness Training in India», American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 100, 125­-129.
  • Foss, K.; Foss, N. y Vázquez, X. H. (2006): «Tying the Manager’s Hands»: Constraining Opportunistic Managerial Intervention», Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 30, No. 5, 797­-818.
  • Frank, B. y Schulze, G. (2000): «Does econo­mics make citizens corrupt?,» Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 43 (1), 101­-113.
  • Frank, R. H.; Gilovich, T. y Regan, D. T. (1993): «Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?», Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (2), 159-­171.
  • Frank, R. H.; Gilovich, T. y Regan, D. T. (1996): «Do Economists Make Bad Citi­zens?», Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1), 187­-192.
  • Gal-Or, E. y Amit, R. (1998): «Does Empower­ment Lead to Higher Quality and Profitabili­ty?», Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 36: 411-­431.
  • Goldstein, M. y Udry, C. (2008): «The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural In­vestment in Ghana», Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 116, N. 6, 981­-1022.
  • Greif, A. (1993): «Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Trader’s Coalition», American Economic Review, Vol. 83, N. 3, 525-­548.
  • Greif, A. (1994): «Cultural Beliefs and the Orga­nization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Indivi­dualist Societies», Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, N. 5, 912-­950.
  • Greif, A. (1998): «Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis», The American Economic Review, Vol. 88, N. 2, 80-­84.
  • Greif, A. (2001): «The Influence of Past Institu­tion on its Rate of Change: Institutional Per­petuation and Endogenous Institutional Change». Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics. Berkeley. California
  • Greif, A. y Kingston, C. (2011): «Institutions: Rules or equilibrium», en Schofield, N. y G. Caballero (eds) (2011): Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting. Springer.
  • Greif, A. y Laitin, D. (2004): «A Theory of En­dogenous Institutional Change», American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, N. 4, 633­-652.
  • Greif, A. y Tabellini, G. (2010): «Cultural and Institutional Bifurcation: China and Europe Compared», American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 100 (2), 1-­10.
  • Grimshaw, D. y Rubery, J. (1998): «Integra­ting the internal and external labour markets», Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22, 199-­220.
  • Hall, P. A. (1986): Governing the economy: The politics of State intervention in Britain and France. Oxford University Press. Nueva York.
  • Hall, P. A. y Taylor, R. (1996): «Political Science and the Three New Institutiona­lism», Political Studies, XLIV, 936­-957.
  • Havrylyshyn, O. y Van Rooden, R. (2003): «Institutions matter in transition, but so do policies», Comparative Economic Studies, 45, 2-­24.
  • Hurwicz, L. (1993): «Toward a framework for Analysing Institutions and Institutional Change», pp. 51­67, en S. Bowles, H. Gintis y B. Gustafsson (eds): Markets and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
  • Jakiela, P. (2010): «Using Economic Experi­ments to Measure Informal Institutions», Conference on The Legacy and Work of Douglass North: Understanding Institutions and Development Economics. Center for New Ins­titutional Social sciences. Washington Uni­versity, St. Louis. USA.
  • Johnson, S.; McMillan, J. C. y Woodruff, C. (2002): «Property Rights and Finance», The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, N. 5, 1335­-1357.
  • Joskow, P. (1991): «Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence», en Williamson, O. y S. Winter (eds): The Nature of the Firm. Oxford Uni­versity Press. Nueva York.
  • Kiser, L. y Ostrom, E. (1982): «The three worlds of action: a metatheoretical synthesis of institutional approaches», en Ostrom, E. (Ed): Strategies of Political Inquiry. Sage, Cali­ fornia.
  • Knack, S. y Keefer, P. (1995): «Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross­ Country Tests using alternative Institutional Measu­res», Economics and Politics, 7, 207-­227.
  • Knack, S. y Keefer, P. (1997): «Does Social Capital have an Economic Payoff? A cross­country investiga­tion», Quaterly Journal of Economics, N, 112 (4), 1251­-1288.
  • Kosfeld, M.; Okada, A. y Riedl, A. (2009): «Institution Formation in Public Good Games», American Economic Review, 99 (4), 1335­-1355.
  • La Porta, R.; Lopez de Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A. y Vishny, R. (1998): «Law and finance», Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, N. 6, 1113-­1155.
  • La Porta, R.; Lopez de Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A. y Vishny, R. (1999): «The quality of government», Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 15, N. 1, 222-­279.
  • Lazear, E. (2000): «Economic Imperialism», Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (1), 99­-146.
  • March, J. G. y Olsen, J. P. (1984): «The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life», American Political Science Review, N. 78, 738-­749.
  • March, J. G. y Olsen, J. P. (1989): Rediscovering Institutions. Free Press. NY.
  • March, J. G. y Olsen, J. P. (1994): Democratic Governance, Free Press. NY.
  • Marwell, G. y Ames, R. E. (1981): «Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?» Journal of Public Economics, 15 (3), 295-­310.
  • Matthews, R. C. O. (1986): «The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Economic Growth», Economic Journal, N. 96, 903­918.
  • Ménard, C. (2001): «Methodological issues in New Institutional Economics», Journal of Economic Methodology, V. 8, N. 1, 85­-92.
  • Miller, G. (1992): Managerial Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Minkler, L. (2004): «Shirking and motivations in firms: survey evidence on worker attitu­des», International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22 (6), 863-­884.
  • Nagin, D. S.; Rebitzer, J. B.; Sanders, S. y Taylor, L. J. (2002): Monitoring, Motiva­tion, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field Experi­ment, The American Economic Review, 92 (4), 850­-873.
  • North, D. C. (1981): Structure and Change in Economic History. W.W. Norton. Nueva York.
  • North, D. C. (1990): Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge Uni­versity Press. Cambridge.
  • North, D. C. (1993): «Autobiography». Nobel e­Mu­seum (Web page).
  • North, D. C. (1994): «Economic Performance through Time», The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, N. 3, 359­-368.
  • North, D. C. (2005): Understanding the process of economic change. Princeton University Press.
  • North, D. C. y Weingast, B. R. (1989): «Cons­titutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth­century England», The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 49, N. 4, 803-­832.
  • North, D. C.; Summerhill y Weingast, B. R. (2000): «Order, Disorder and Economic Change: Latin America versus North Ameri­can «, en B. Bueno de Mesquita y H. Rot (eds): Governing for Prosperity, Yale University Press.
  • Ostrom, E. (2007): «Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis», Journal of Institutional Economics, 3 (3), 239-­264.
  • Pénard, T. (2008): «Game Theory and Institu­tions», 159­-177, en Brousseau, E. y Glachant, J. M. (2008): New Institutional Economics. A Guidebok. CUP.
  • Peters, G. (1999): Institutional Theory in Political Science: The «New Institutionalism». Rout­ledge.
  • Robin, S. y Staropoli, C. (2008): «Experimen­tal methodology to inform New Institutional Economics Issues», 142-­157, en Brousseau, E. y J. M. Glachant (2008): New Institutional Economics. A Guidebok. CUP.
  • Shepsle, K. A. (1986): «Institutional equili­ brium and equilibrium institutions», pp. 51­ 81, en H. F. Weisberg (ed): Political Science: the science of Politics. Agathon, Nueva York.
  • Stevens, M. (1996) «Transferable training and poaching externalities» in Acquiring Skills: Market failures, their symptoms and policy responses. A. Booth and D. J. Snower (eds.), 19­40. Cambridge: Centre for Economic Po­licy Research.
  • Stigler, G. J. y Becker, G. (1977): «De Gusti­bus Non Est Disputandum», American Economic Review, 67 (2), 76­-90.
  • Sykuta, M. E. (2008): «New Institutional Eco­nometrics: The Case of Research on Contrac­ting and Organization», 122­-141, en Brous­seau, E. y J. M. Glachant (2008): New Institutional Economics. A Guidebok. CUP.
  • Vázquez, X. H. (2004): «Allocation of decision rights on the shop floor: a perspective from Transaction Cost Economics and Organiza­tion Theory», Organization Science, Vol. 15, No. 4, 463­-480.
  • Vázquez, X. H. (2006): «An eclectic explanation of sho­ pfloor control using efficiency and power theories», Organization Studies, Vol. 27, No. 10, 1421­1446.
  • Wallis, J. J. y North, D. C. (1986): «Measuring the Transaction Sector in the American Eco­nomy» en S.L. Engerman and R.E. Gallman, (eds.), Long Term Factors in American Economic Growth, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Weingast, B. (1995): «The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market ­Preserving Federalism and Economic Development», Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 11, 1­-31.
  • Weingast, B. (1996): «Political institutions: rational choice perspectives», en Goodin, R. E, y H. D, Klingemann (eds): A new handbook of political science, 167-­190. Oxford University Press.
  • Williamson, O. E. (2000): «The New Institu­tional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead», Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.38, 595­-613.
Fonte de datos: Dialnet