Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes

  1. María Gómez-Rúa 1
  1. 1 Universidade de Vigo
    info

    Universidade de Vigo

    Vigo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05rdf8595

Aldizkaria:
SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

ISSN: 1869-4195

Argitalpen urtea: 2013

Alea: 4

Zenbakia: 2

Orrialdeak: 137-153

Mota: Artikulua

DOI: 10.1007/S13209-011-0083-2 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openSarbide irekia editor

Beste argitalpen batzuk: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

Laburpena

n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost.We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents.We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem.

Datuen iturria: Dialnet