The division problem with maximal capacity constraints

  1. Gustavo Bergantiños 1
  2. Jordi Massó 2
  3. Alejandro Neme 3
  1. 1 Universidade de Vigo
    info

    Universidade de Vigo

    Vigo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05rdf8595

  2. 2 Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
    info

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

    Barcelona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/052g8jq94

  3. 3 Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Argentina
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Zeitschrift:
SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

ISSN: 1869-4195

Datum der Publikation: 2012

Titel der Ausgabe: Salvador Barberà

Ausgabe: 3

Nummer: 1-2

Seiten: 29-57

Art: Artikel

DOI: 10.1007/S13209-011-0055-6 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen Access editor

Andere Publikationen in: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association

Zusammenfassung

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. Most of the literature has implicitly assumed that all divisions are feasible. In this paper we consider the division problem when each agent has a maximal capacity due to an objective and verifiable feasibility constraint which imposes an upper bound on his share. Then each agent has a feasible interval of shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent a feasible share. We focus mainly on strategy-proof, efficient and consistent rules and provide alternative characterizations of the extension of the uniform rule that deals explicitly with agents’ maximal capacity constraints.

Fuente de los datos: Dialnet