Irrelevance of private information in two-period economies with more goods than states of natur

  1. Joao Correia da Silva 1
  2. Carlos Hervés Beloso
  1. 1 Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto
Aldizkaria:
Working paper series ( RGEA )

Argitalpen urtea: 2013

Zenbakia: 4

Mota: Laneko dokumentua

Laburpena

We introduce a two-period economy with asymmetric information about the state of nature that occurs in the second period. Each agent is endowed with an informa- tion structure that describes her (incomplete) ability to prove whether or not a state has occurred. We show that if the number of states of nature is not greater than the number of goods, then, generically, the equilibria of the associated full information economy are also equilibria of the asymmetric information economy. The information structures of the agents are, in that sense, irrelevant.