On two basic properties of Equilibria of voting with exit

  1. Dolors Berga 1
  2. Gustavo Bergantiños 2
  3. Jordi Massó 3
  4. Alejandro Neme 4
  1. 1 girona
  2. 2 vigo
  3. 3 Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
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    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

    Barcelona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/052g8jq94

    Localización xeográfica da organización Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
  4. 4 Universidad Nacional de San Luis
    info
    Universidad Nacional de San Luis

    San Luis, Argentina

    ROR https://ror.org/00mczdx43

    Localización xeográfica da organización Universidad Nacional de San Luis
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Revista:
Working paper series ( RGEA )

Ano de publicación: 2008

Número: 15

Tipo: Documento de traballo

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Obxectivos de Desenvolvemento Sustentable

Resumo

We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. We show that, under plausible restrictions on preferences, equilibria of this two-stage game satisfy stability and voter's sovereignty.

Fonte de datos: Dialnet