On the relationship between corporate governance and value creation in an economic crisisempirical evidence for the spanish case

  1. Mónica Villanueva-Villar 1
  2. Elena Rivo-López 1
  3. Santiago Lago-Peñas 1
  1. 1 Universidade de Vigo
    info

    Universidade de Vigo

    Vigo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05rdf8595

Revista:
Business Research Quarterly

ISSN: 2340-9444 2340-9436

Ano de publicación: 2016

Volume: 19

Número: 4

Páxinas: 233-245

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.1016/J.BRQ.2016.06.002 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso aberto editor

Outras publicacións en: Business Research Quarterly

Resumo

This paper analyses the effect of corporate governance on value creation. It relies upon a dataset that includes the companies listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange for the period from 2005 to 2012. Attention is focused on the structure and composition of boards. In particular, four variables are analyzed: BOARD SIZE, BOARD INDEPENDENCE, BOARD DILIGENCE (measured by the number of meetings), and DUALITY (chairman and chief executive officer being the same person). Over the period of the deepest economic crisis (2009---2012) the most significant variables that had a positive effect on value creation were BOARD INDEPENDENCE and BOARD SIZE. Hence, the global financial crisis has highlighted the need for effective corporate governance. Policy makers should think about translating the recommendations of the Good Governance Codes into legislation (mandatory), to improve corporate governance.

Información de financiamento

Besides, we would like to thank the financial support by the Family Business Chair (University of Vigo)

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