Optimality of relaxing revenue-neutral restrictions in Green Tax reforms
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Universidade de Vigo
info
ISSN: 0210-1173
Datum der Publikation: 2020
Nummer: 233
Seiten: 3-24
Art: Artikel
Andere Publikationen in: Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics
Zusammenfassung
Las Reformas Fiscales Verdes [RFV] han sido inicialmente concebidas como una propuesta de política para resolver simultáneamente varios objetivos de política. Los recientes episodios de tensiones fiscales han desafiado esta vision. En este artículo, estudiamos un elemento clave de interés para los responsa- bles políticos: tomando como punto de partida un sistema fiscal que no incluye un impuesto medioam- biental, ¿se obtendría un menú impositivo óptimo si se implementase una RFV neutral en recaudación? Nuestro trabajo ilustra en un ejemplo simple y parametrizado, que la respuesta es negativa. Este resul- tado se separa de la vision convencional y provee un soporte teórico a la tercera generación de RFV.
Informationen zur Finanzierung
Financial support from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Education and ERDF (project ECO2016- 76625-R) and the Galician regional government (grant ED431C 2017/063) are acknowledged by the second authorGeldgeber
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Ministry for Science and Education and ERDF
Spain
- ECO2016- 76625-R
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Xunta de Galicia
Spain
- ED431C 2017/063
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