An Application of Power Indices for the Family of Weighted Majority Games in Partition Function Form

  1. Alonso-Meijide, J. M. 23
  2. Armijos-Toro, L. M. 24
  3. Casas-Méndez, B. 24
  4. Mosquera, M. A. 12
  1. 1 Universidade de Vigo, Departamento de Estatística e Investigación Operativa, 32004, Ourense, Spain
  2. 2 CITMAga, 15782, Santiago de Compostela, Coruna, Spain
  3. 3 MODESTYA Research Group, Department of Statistics, Mathematical Analysis and Optimisation, Faculty of Sciences, University of Santiago de Compostela, Campus de Lugo, 27002, Lugo, Spain
  4. 4 MODESTYA Research Group, Department of Statistics, Mathematical Analysis and Optimisation, Faculty of Mathematics, University of Santiago de Compostela, Campus Vida, 15782, Santiago de Compostela, Coruna, Spain
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Libro:
Power and Responsibility

ISBN: 9783031230141,  9783031230158

Ano de publicación: 2023

Páxinas: 143-164

Tipo: Capítulo de libro

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-23015-8_8 GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso aberto editor

Resumo

Based on Holler (1982), Colomer and Martínez (1995), and Armijos-Toro et al. (2021), we propose two power indices to measure the influence of the players in these classes of weighted majority games in partition function form. We compare the new power indices with their original versions on the class of games in characteristic function form. Finally, we use both new power indices and the two power indices for games in partition function form studied in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017) to study the distribution of power in the National Assembly of Ecuador that emerged after the elections of February 7, 2021.

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