Monotonicity of the core-center of the airport game

  1. Julio González-Díaz 1
  2. Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo 2
  3. Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo 2
  4. Estela Sánchez Rodríguez 2
  1. 1 Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, España
  2. 2 Universidade de Vigo, España

ISSN: 1863-8279 1134-5764

Ano de publicación: 2015

Volume: 23

Número: 3

Páxinas: 773-798

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.1007/S11750-014-0358-4 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso aberto editor

Outras publicacións en: Top


One of the main goals of this paper is to improve the understanding of the way in which the core of a specific cooperative game, the airport game (Littlechild and Owen, Manag Sci 20:370–372, 1973), responds to monotonicity properties. Since such properties are defined for single-valued allocation rules, we use the core-center (González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez, Int J Game Theory 36:27–46, 2007) as a proxy for the core. This is natural, since the core-center is the center of gravity of the core and its behavior with respect to a given property can be interpreted as the “average behavior” of the core. We also introduce the lower-cost increasing monotonicity and higher-cost decreasing monotonicity properties that reflect whether a variation in a particular agent’s cost is beneficial to the other agents.