Mercados financieros, falsos dioses

  1. Costas Comesaña, Antón
  2. Arias Moreira, Xosé Carlos
Revista:
Mediterráneo económico
  1. Pérez Fernández, José (coord.)
  2. Díez Gangas, José Carlos (coord.)

ISSN: 1698-3726

Ano de publicación: 2011

Título do exemplar: El Sistema Bancario tras la Gran Recesión

Número: 19

Páxinas: 17-39

Tipo: Artigo

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Outras publicacións en: Mediterráneo económico

Resumo

The crisis of 2008 called into question the virtues attributed to deregulated financial markets in terms of the efficient allocation of resources and the reduction of risk and volatility in the economy. The supposed superior capacity of markets over public regulation is now in doubt, not only in academic spheres and among policy-makers, but also and particularly in public opinion. Hence, questions arise such as: What can the crisis teach us about the role of markets? Will we be able to use this knowledge to turn around the thinking and political and macroeconomic policy that dominated throughout the long period leading up to the crisis, or will we see a cynical use of this knowledge to, in the style of Il Gatopardo, promote minor reforms aimed at ensuring that nothing changes? In any case, what will the new equilibrium be between politics and the markets after the crisis? This article seeks to find an answer to these kinds of questions.

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Fonte de datos: Dialnet