Equilibria in a competitive model arising from linear production situations with a common-pool resource

  1. E. Gutiérrez 1
  2. N. Llorca 1
  3. J. Sánchez-Soriano 1
  4. M. A. Mosquera 2
  1. 1 Universidad Miguel Hernández, España
  2. 2 Universidade de Vigo, España
Revista:
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ISSN: 1863-8279,  1134-5764

Any de publicació: 2017

Volum: 25

Número: 2

Pàgines: 394-401

Tipus: Article

DOI: 10.1007/S11750-017-0438-3 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAccés obert editor

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Resum

In this paper we deal with linear production situations in which there is a limited common-pool resource, managed by an external agent. The profit that a producer can attain depends on the amount of common-pool resource obtained through a certain procedure. We contemplate a competitive process among the producers and study the corresponding non-cooperative games, describing their (strict) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. It is shown that strict Nash equilibria form a subset of strong Nash equilibria, which in turn form a proper subset of Nash equilibria.

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