Equilibria in a competitive model arising from linear production situations with a common-pool resource
- E. Gutiérrez 1
- N. Llorca 1
- J. Sánchez-Soriano 1
- M. A. Mosquera 2
- 1 Universidad Miguel Hernández, España
- 2 Universidade de Vigo, España
ISSN: 1863-8279, 1134-5764
Datum der Publikation: 2017
Ausgabe: 25
Nummer: 2
Seiten: 394-401
Art: Artikel
Andere Publikationen in: Top
Zusammenfassung
In this paper we deal with linear production situations in which there is a limited common-pool resource, managed by an external agent. The profit that a producer can attain depends on the amount of common-pool resource obtained through a certain procedure. We contemplate a competitive process among the producers and study the corresponding non-cooperative games, describing their (strict) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. It is shown that strict Nash equilibria form a subset of strong Nash equilibria, which in turn form a proper subset of Nash equilibria.
Informationen zur Finanzierung
Geldgeber
-
Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte
- MTM2011-23205
- MTM2014-54199-P
-
Fundación Séneca
- 19320/PI/14
-
Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte
- MTM2011-27731-C03
- MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P
-
Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte
- MTM2011-23205
- MTM2014-54199-P
-
Fundación Séneca
- 19320/PI/14