Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games
- Arantza Estévez-Fernández 1
- Peter Borm 2
- M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro 3
- 1 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Países Bajos
- 2 Tilburg University, Países Bajos
- 3 Universidade de Vigo, España
ISSN: 1863-8279, 1134-5764
Datum der Publikation: 2020
Ausgabe: 28
Nummer: 1
Seiten: 154-177
Art: Artikel
Andere Publikationen in: Top
Zusammenfassung
In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalition-merge convex and ordinally convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.