Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games

  1. Arantza Estévez-Fernández 1
  2. Peter Borm 2
  3. M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro 3
  1. 1 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Países Bajos
  2. 2 Tilburg University, Países Bajos
  3. 3 Universidade de Vigo, España
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Journal:
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ISSN: 1863-8279,  1134-5764

Year of publication: 2020

Volume: 28

Issue: 1

Pages: 154-177

Type: Article

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalition-merge convex and ordinally convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games.

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