Persistencia institucional y costes de transacción en la política electoral española

  1. Gonzalo CABALLERO
  2. Ignacio LAGO
Revista:
Papeles de economía española

ISSN: 0210-9107

Any de publicació: 2021

Títol de l'exemplar: La calidad de las instituciones y la economía española

Número: 168

Pàgines: 144-156

Tipus: Article

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Altres publicacions en: Papeles de economía española

Resum

En este artículo se examinan los fundamentos del enfoque institucional en economía y ciencia política, en particular la naturaleza de los costes de transacción en los mercados económico y político. Tras presentar la literatura en economía, explicamos los tipos de costes de transacción existentes en el mercado político-electoral. Con datos agregados e individuales mostramos cómo las reglas electorales y la identificación de partido influyen en la estabilidad del equilibrio en el sistema de partidos en España.

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